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ABSTRACT 
 
Since its enactment in 1996, § 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act has shielded Web site operators from liability arising 
out of third-party content. The statute preempts any claim that would 
treat the defendant as a “publisher” or “speaker” of that content, but 
recent cases suggest that a defendant’s own statements may 
constitute an independent source of liability beyond the scope of 
§ 230. In Mazur v. eBay, a federal district court held that § 230 does 
not bar claims of fraudulent misrepresentation when a defendant has 
described a third party’s auctioning procedures as “safe.” More 
recently, the Ninth Circuit in Barnes v. Yahoo! allowed a promissory 
estoppel claim to proceed against a defendant that failed to remove 
defamatory material from its Web site after assuring the plaintiff it 
would do so. A third case, Goddard v. Google, suggests that the 
Barnes decision could support claims by third-party beneficiaries as 
well. This Article analyzes these recent developments, discusses their 
potential impact on representations in marketing and terms of use, 
and assesses the willingness of courts to consider more expansive 
fraud- and contract-based limitations on § 230 immunity.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA)1 shields 
Web site operators from liability by barring causes of action that 
would treat them as the “publisher” or “speaker” of third-party 
content.2
However, a recent line of cases suggests that a Web site 
operator’s affirmative representations regarding its third-party content 
could create an alternative basis for liability to which § 230 does not 
apply. In Mazur v. eBay,
 Courts have been willing to apply its provisions to virtually 
any kind of dispute involving third-party content. 
3 a federal district court held that § 230 did 
not bar a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation, and in Barnes v. 
Yahoo!,4 the Ninth Circuit allowed a promissory estoppel claim to 
proceed on the grounds that it did not treat the defendant as a 
“publisher.” A more recent case, Goddard v. Google,5
                                                                                                         
1  47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006). 
 suggests that 
the Barnes holding could support claims by third-party beneficiaries 
as well. These cases reveal that affirmative representations can give 
2  See generally 4 RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER 
TECHNOLOGY § 14:11 (4th ed. 2010). 
3  Mazur v. eBay Inc., No. 07-03967, 2008 WL 618988 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 
2008). 
4  Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009). 
5  Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
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rise to liability if they amount to fraudulent misrepresentation or 
constitute an enforceable promise, creating potential pitfalls for 
online businesses with respect to marketing, customer service, and 
even user agreements. 
This Article first provides an overview of § 230 and the early 
attempts by plaintiffs to establish liability without treating the 
defendant as a publisher. Next, the Article analyzes the recent cases 
that have begun to recognize a limit on § 230 immunity based on a 
defendant’s own representations. The Article concludes by discussing 
how these decisions are shaping CDA jurisprudence and the 
implications for Web site operators. 
 
I. A THREE-PART TEST FOR IMMUNITY 
 
Section 230 was designed, in part, to allow Web site operators to 
voluntarily monitor their sites for offensive or obscene material 
without exposing themselves to liability for third-party content.6 The 
statute declares that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider.”7
To determine whether a defendant is entitled to immunity, courts 
engage in a three-part analysis.
  
8 First, the defendant must be a 
“provider or user of an interactive computer service.”9 This 
effectively encompasses all Web sites.10 Next, because the scope of 
§ 230 extends only to third-party content, the defendant will not 
receive immunity if it is “responsible … for the creation or 
development”11
                                                                                                         
6  Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 of the offending content. Finally, the cause of action 
must treat the defendant as the “publisher” or “speaker” of the 
7  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006). 
8  See, e.g., Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 418–
22 (1st Cir. 2007). 
9  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006). 
10  The Internet itself qualifies as an “interactive computer service,” and 
therefore, a defendant need only be a “user” of the Internet to satisfy the first prong 
of the test. Because every Web site operator is necessarily an Internet user, this 
requirement is rarely the subject of litigation. See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 
1030–31 (9th Cir. 2003). 
11  See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (defining “information content provider”). 
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content.12 Claims that would hold the defendant liable in some other 
capacity are unaffected by § 230.13
 
 It is this distinction that makes 
affirmative representations potentially problematic. 
II. EARLY ATTEMPTS AT ESTABLISHING AN ALTERNATIVE BASIS FOR 
LIABILITY 
 
To avoid treating the defendant as a publisher, plaintiffs have 
long sought to base their claims on actions by the defendant that go 
beyond a publisher’s “traditional editorial functions,”14 thereby 
providing an independent basis for liability. For instance, in 
Blumenthal v. Drudge15 the plaintiff argued that AOL could be held 
liable for the defamatory material of co-defendant Matt Drudge 
because AOL had “affirmatively promoted Drudge as a new source of 
unverified instant gossip.”16 The court nevertheless concluded that 
the language of § 230 clearly protected the decision to advertise third-
party content.17 In Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc.,18 a defendant had 
promised to remove certain offensive postings within two business 
days but failed to do so.19 Although the plaintiff argued that this 
promise constituted an independently enforceable obligation, the 
court determined that it fell within the scope of § 230 because the 
“purported breach—failure to remove the posting—[was] an exercise 
of editorial discretion.”20 Courts have also rejected arguments based 
on a defendant’s failure to enforce standards of conduct set out in its 
membership agreement.21
                                                                                                         
12  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006). 
 As these early cases illustrate, plaintiffs 
13  See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1107 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(denying immunity where defendant breached an independent contractual duty). 
14  “Traditional editorial functions” include “deciding whether to publish, 
withdraw, postpone or alter content.” See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 
330 (4th Cir. 1997).  
15  Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp 44 (D.D.C. 1998). 
16  Id. at 51. 
17  Id. at 52–53. 
18  Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). 
19  Id. at 38–39. 
20  Id. at 42. 
21  See, e.g., Green v. Am. Online, Inc., 318 F.3d 465 (3rd Cir. 2003); 
Morrison v. Am. Online, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 930 (N.D. Ind. 2001). 
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have historically been unsuccessful at suing defendants for third-party 
material without also treating them as publishers. 
 
III. FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION IN MAZUR V. EBAY 
 
The ruling in Mazur v. eBay, however, put Web site operators on 
notice that their own statements regarding third-party content could 
carry significant consequences. In Mazur, the defendant offered a 
service called Live Auctions, which allowed users to participate in 
formal auctions via the Internet as if they were physically there.22 
Third-party auction houses conducted the auctions; eBay merely 
provided the service that allowed people to place bids at these 
auctions over the Internet.23 On its Web site, eBay claimed that this 
service was “very safe,” that the live auctions involved “floor 
bidders,” and that the auctions were conducted by “reputable 
international auction houses” that were “carefully screened.”24 
Nevertheless, the plaintiff alleged that shill bidders25
The court analyzed each of eBay’s assertions independently. It 
determined that eBay was entitled to immunity for its representation 
that the auction houses were “reputable” and “carefully screened.”
 at the auction 
house caused her to overpay. She sued eBay, claiming that its 
statements regarding the live auctions amounted to fraudulent 
misrepresentation. 
26 
The court explained that “screening” auction houses is analogous to 
deciding what to publish, and is therefore a traditional editorial 
function shielded by § 230.27 Furthermore, the words “carefully” and 
“reputable” indicate opinions, which are not actionable.28
However, eBay's assertions that the live auctions were “safe” and 
 
                                                                                                         
22  Mazur v. eBay Inc., No. 07-03967, 2008 WL 618988, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 4, 2008). 
23  On April 15, 2008, eBay announced that it would discontinue its Live 
Auctions service. General Announcements, EBAY.COM, (April 15, 2008), 
http://www2.ebay.com/aw/core/200804151300402.html.  
24  Mazur, 2008 WL 618988, at *8. 
25  “Shill bidding” is the practice of entering fake bids in order to drive up the 
price of an auction item. 
26  Mazur, 2008 WL 618988, at *9. 
27  Id. 
28  Id. 
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involved “floor bidders” at “international” auction houses were held 
to be actionable as affirmative representations.29 According to the 
opinion, these statements went beyond traditional editorial discretion 
because they created “an expectation regarding the procedures and 
manner in which the auction is conducted.”30 The court indicated that 
if eBay had made assurances of accuracy, it would have received 
immunity, as verifying accuracy constitutes a traditional editorial 
function.31 Assurances of safety, however, would fall outside the 
scope of § 230.32
The court also determined that eBay’s disclaimers were 
ineffective for two reasons. First, they failed to negate either the 
assurance of safety or the implicit suggestion that eBay had 
investigated the auction houses.
 
33 Although eBay stated in its User 
Agreement that it had no control over the safety of the auctions and 
could not guarantee that the auction houses complied with applicable 
laws, “nothing [in the User Agreement] specifically state[d] that eBay 
[did] not guarantee that bidding in Live Auctions [was] safe.”34 
Second, eBay failed to demonstrate that the initial safety assurances 
were attributable to another source, such as user feedback.35
IV. CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY IN BARNES V. YAHOO! AND  
GODDARD V. GOOGLE 
 As a 
result, users could not independently assess the veracity of the claim 
and were left to depend on eBay’s representations. Having made the 
statements on its own behalf, eBay could no longer rely on general 
disclaimers applicable to third-party conduct. 
 
A defendant’s liability is not limited to fraud, however. A recent 
Ninth Circuit case demonstrates that affirmative representations can 
furnish the basis for liability under contract principles as well. 
                                                                                                         
29  Id. at *10. 
30  Id. at *12. 
31  See id. See also Milo v. Martin, 311 S.W.3d 210 (Tex. App. 2010) (finding 
defendant not liable for the defamatory posts of users, despite assurances of 
accuracy found elsewhere on its Web site). 
32  See Mazur, 2008 WL 618988, at *12. 
33  Id. at *10. 
34  Id. at *11. 
35  Id. at *10. 
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In Barnes v. Yahoo!,36 the plaintiff discovered that her ex-
boyfriend had created fake profiles under her name on a Yahoo! Web 
site.37 Over the next two months, Barnes made four requests to have 
the profiles taken down, but Yahoo! never responded to any of 
them.38 Finally, as local news prepared to broadcast a report on the 
incident, a representative from Yahoo! contacted Barnes and told her 
that she would “personally walk the statements over to the division 
responsible for stopping unauthorized profiles and they would take 
care of it.”39 Despite this assurance however, the profiles remained on 
the Web site until Barnes filed suit two months later, alleging 
promissory estoppel and negligent undertaking.40
The court held that § 230 did not preempt a promissory estoppel 
claim arising out of the defendant’s promise to remove third-party 
content from its Web site.
 
41 According to the opinion, such a claim 
would not seek to treat the defendant as a “publisher.”42 Instead, it 
was the defendant’s promise, and not its status as a publisher, that 
gave rise to liability.43 The court did, however, hold that § 230 barred 
the plaintiff’s negligent undertaking claim, explaining that if the 
action the defendant undertook to do was “something [that] 
publishers do,” then the cause of action would seek to hold the 
defendant liable as a publisher.44 In this case, the “duty” allegedly 
violated stemmed from Yahoo!'s conduct as a publisher—“the steps it 
allegedly took, but later supposedly abandoned, to de-publish the 
offensive profiles.”45
The two claims differed in one important respect. “Undertake” is 
synonymous with the performance of the action; “[t]o undertake a 
thing ... is to do it.”
 
46
                                                                                                         
36  Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 In contrast, one can promise to do something 
without actually doing it. Consequently, a defendant cannot be held 
37  Id. at 1098. 
38  Id. 
39  Id. at 1098–99. 
40  Id. at 1099. 
41  Id. at 1109. 
42  Id. at 1107. 
43  Id. 
44  Id. at 1103. 
45  Id. 
46  Id. at 1107. 
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liable for undertaking an editorial action, but it can be liable for 
breaking a promise, even if that promise was to undertake an editorial 
action. 47
A federal district court in Goddard v. Google
 The promise itself gives rise to a duty that is distinct from 
the conduct at hand.  
48 has since 
concluded that the rule in Barnes would also permit claims by third-
party beneficiaries.49 “Theoretically, intended third-party 
beneficiaries—whose rights under a contract are different from those 
of the contracting parties but still are legally cognizable—could 
invoke the distinction drawn in Barnes between liability for acts that 
are coextensive with publishing or speaking and liability for breach of 
an independent contractual duty.”50 The plaintiff in Goddard was an 
Internet user who incurred fees after downloading purportedly “free” 
ringtones from a Web site that appeared as a “sponsored result” on 
the defendant’s search engine.51 The terms of Google’s advertising 
contracts required advertisers to disclose information about any fees 
they might charge.52 Because the advertisement that appeared on 
Google’s Web site lacked such information, the complaint alleged 
that Google had breached the terms of its advertising contracts.53 The 
plaintiff claimed to be a third-party beneficiary of those contracts.54
Though the court acknowledged the possibility of suits by third-
party beneficiaries, it nonetheless dismissed the plaintiff’s claim, 
citing two flaws.
 
55 First, it was the advertisers, not Google, who 
promised to disclose information about fees and who subsequently 
broke that promise.56
                                                                                                         
47  See id. (“Contract liability here would come not from Yahoo’s publishing 
conduct, but from Yahoo’s manifest intention to be legally obligated to do 
something, which happens to be removal of material from publication.”) 
 The contracts did not contain any promise by 
Google to enforce their terms or to remove noncompliant 
48  Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
49  Id. at 1200. 
50  Id. 
51  Id. at 1194, 1197. 
52  Id. at 1199. 
53  Id. 
54  Id. 
55  Id. at 1200–01. 
56  Id. at 1201. 
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advertisements. 57 Second, even if Google had promised to police its 
Web site for noncompliant advertisements, there was no indication 
that the promisees (the advertising companies) had intended for the 
plaintiff to benefit from such a promise.58 The plaintiff therefore did 
not qualify as a third-party beneficiary.59
The contractual theory of liability that emerges from Barnes and 
Goddard is subject to two important limitations that distinguish it 
from the approach seen in Mazur. The Barnes court stressed that a 
promise must be clear and specific if it is to support a promissory 
estoppel claim: “[A] court cannot simply infer a promise from an 
attempt to de-publish of the sort that might support tort liability” 
under a theory of promissory estoppel.
 
 60 The Goddard court 
explained that “general content policies” do not constitute a promise 
by the Web site to take any specific action with regard to third-party 
content.61
The other critical distinction between the two theories is that, 
under Barnes, a potential defendant can avoid liability by simply 
disclaiming any intent to be legally bound.
 A general claim of safety, such as the one in Mazur, would 
likely fail to meet this specificity requirement. 
62
 
 In contrast, the Mazur 
opinion would seem to limit the availability of disclaimers to 
situations where the Web site operator has either explicitly disavowed 
its own statements or clearly indicated that those statements are 
attributable to a source other than itself. 
 
                                                                                                         
57  Id. (“Neither agreement contains any promise by Google to enforce its 
terms of use or otherwise to remove noncompliant advertisements.”) 
58  Id. The court stated that Goddard might well be able to sue the advertisers 
for breaching their promise to abide by the Advertising Terms if she could 
demonstrate that Google had intended for her to be a beneficiary of that agreement. 
59  Id. 
60  Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1108 (9th Cir. 2009). 
61  Goddard, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 1201. It should be noted that although the 
Barnes court did not address whether the actual statement by the Yahoo 
representative would suffice for purposes of promissory estoppel, the Goddard 
opinion suggests that it would. “[T]he claim in Barnes … rested on a promise that 
scarcely could have been clearer or more direct.” Id. 
62  See Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1108. 
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V. STRATEGIES FOR MAINTAINING IMMUNITY 
 
As a result of these developments, Web site operators run the risk 
of sacrificing § 230 immunity when they issue statements regarding 
their third-party material. However, a Web site operator may be able 
to minimize its exposure by taking certain measures.  
When promoting a product or service, a Web site operator must 
have a clear understanding of the message being conveyed.  If an 
affirmative representation tends to suggest that a particular harm will 
not occur in connection with that product or service, the Web site 
operator could be viewed as having voluntarily assumed 
responsibility for its third-party content.63 Similarly, if a Web site 
operator imposes restrictions in its user agreement on the type of 
material that third parties can post, it might inadvertently assume a 
duty to enforce those standards by blocking or removing offensive 
material. Any statements to this effect should include language 
alerting users to the possibility that nonconforming content may 
appear on the site.64
The form of the representation warrants particular attention. 
Anything phrased as a promise or assurance has the potential to bind 
the Web site operator, so companies should instruct their employees 
to avoid making such statements to outside parties. Because 
representations of fact are actionable, Web sites should consider 
phrasing that would tend to indicate an opinion. Along the same lines, 
it may be helpful to insert language into a representation that relates 
back to an editorial function. The Mazur court indicated that a 
plaintiff could not sue a Web site for commenting on its own 
publishing activities, as doing so would treat the defendant as a 
publisher.
 
65
To avoid falling victim to the contractual theories of liability 
 
                                                                                                         
63  Eric Goldman, eBay Denied 230 Defense for Its Marketing 
Representations--Mazur v. eBay, TECHNOLOGY & MARKETING LAW BLOG (Mar. 
13, 2008), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2008/03/ebay_denied_230.htm. 
64  For further suggestions on drafting user agreements, see Eric Goldman, 
Lori Drew Conviction Reflections, Part 3 of 3: Lessons for Cyberlawyers Drafting 
User Agreements, TECHNOLOGY & MARKETING LAW BLOG (Dec. 16, 2008), 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2008/12/lori_drew_convi_2.htm. 
65  Mazur v. eBay Inc., No. 07-03967, 2008 WL 618988, at *9 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 4, 2008). 
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developed in the Barnes and Goddard cases, one should always 
disclaim any intent to be legally bound. This is especially important 
when the Web site is providing assistance or otherwise responding to 
user requests. Furthermore, if the Web site is contracting with another 
party, such as an advertiser, the contract should specify that no one 
other than the contracting parties is intended to be a beneficiary of the 
agreement.  
As the Mazur case illustrates, however, Web site operators will 
not always be able to protect themselves through the use of 
disclaimers. The court made it clear that if it is to be effective at all, a 
disclaimer must specifically negate the affirmative representation,66 
although given the court’s manifest hostility toward their use,67
Whenever possible, a Web site will want to attribute a 
representation to some source other than itself. For example, the 
Mazur court indicated that eBay would have been entitled to 
immunity had its assertion of safety been made on the basis of user 
feedback, rather than its own independent assessment.
 it is 
doubtful that disclaimers would ever be effective under the Mazur 
standard.  
68
 
 Web sites 
can avoid responsibility by indicating that the representation 
originated elsewhere. If, on the other hand, a particular statement 
represents an assertion by the Web site itself, the threat of litigation 
can be minimized by disclosing the basis for these assertions or the 
criteria used to reach a particular conclusion. This allows users to 
evaluate the claims for themselves. 
VI. A NEW DIRECTION FOR CDA JURISPRUDENCE? 
 
Given the highly fact-dependent nature of their holdings, it is 
unlikely that these recent decisions will appreciably alter the balance 
                                                                                                         
66  See id. at *10–11. 
67  The court determined that eBay’s disclaimers were ineffective despite 
language such as “We have no control over the quality, safety, or legality of the 
items advertised” and “You will not hold eBay responsible for other users’ actions 
or inactions, including things they post.” See id. at *10, n.9; *12. Citing the fact that 
eBay “burie[d the] disclaimer in a User Agreement” and possessed “superior 
bargaining power,” the court stated that it would deny eBay’s motion to dismiss if 
the affirmative representation and the disclaimer were contradictory. Id. at *13.  
68  Id. at *10. 
11
Doty: Choose Your Words Wisely: Affirmative Representation as a Limit o
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2011
270 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS  [VOL. 6:4 
of power in § 230 disputes. However, while these cases—Mazur, 
Barnes, and Goddard—represent developments at the margins, they 
may nevertheless reflect a conscious effort by the judiciary to prevent 
an already generous grant of immunity from expanding further. When 
it came to their publishing activities, Web site operators once faced 
virtually no threat of liability, but a more nuanced application of 
§ 230 creates new avenues for plaintiffs to explore. The idea that 
immunity can be lost by “affirmatively promoting” content, 
ultimately rejected in Blumenthal, has gained traction in the wake of 
Mazur. Whereas Schneider had extended immunity to contract claims 
if the breach resulted from an exercise of editorial discretion, Barnes 
now imposes liability under virtually identical facts. Even a contract 
between a Web site and an advertiser may create enforceable rights in 
other parties under the reasoning of Goddard. Plaintiffs are sure to 
test the limits of these emerging theories in future cases. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Although § 230 of the CDA preempts any cause of action that 
would treat the defendant as a “publisher” or “speaker” of third-party 
content, recent cases demonstrate that suits premised on a Web site 
operator’s own statements do not necessarily fall within this category. 
As a result of Mazur v. eBay, Barnes v. Yahoo!, and Goddard v. 
Google, affirmative representations regarding third-party content may 
now serve as an independent source of liability if they amount to 
fraudulent misrepresentation or constitute an enforceable promise. 
These developments will affect how Web sites can market third-party 
content, interact with users, and form agreements with other parties. 
 
PRACTICE POINTERS 
 
 Although § 230 provides protection against liability arising out of 
third-party content, Web site operators remain fully responsible for 
the accuracy of their statements regarding that content. 
 Section 230 provides no defense to binding contracts created 
under the theory of promissory estoppel, even when the statement 
giving rise to the obligation revolves around third-party content. 
 Disclaimers may be sufficient to protect a Web site operator 
12
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against promissory estoppel claims, but they are unlikely to protect 
against claims of fraudulent misrepresentation. 
 Web site operators can reduce the threat of litigation by either 
explaining the basis for their affirmative representations or 
attributing them to another source. 
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